








In the aftermath of NATO’s intervention in Libya, a number of commentators have focused on the 
relationship between the responsibility to protect (RtoP) and regime change, considering whether 
the latter was allowed under Resolution 1973, which authorized Member States - in the name of 
RtoP - to take ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat 
of attack.  
Although the forcible replacement of a regime that is guilty of grave human rights violations is a 
potential means of implementing the responsibility to protect, at least in extreme cases, it would 
certainly not be a desirable application of the doctrine. This Author suggests a different reading of 
the impact of RtoP on States responsible for massive violations of fundamental rights: namely, their 
de-legitimation. Less critical than regime change, regime de-legitimation is a perfect application of 
one basic pillar of RtoP, the idea of sovereignty as responsibility towards people.  
After a general survey of the impact on RtoP of the adoption of Resolutions 1970 and 1973, on one 
hand, and NATO’s intervention, on the other (2), the paper goes on to consider regime change in 
Libya, achieved by foreign military intervention in an internal conflict (3). Then, having assessed 
the conditions at which the overthrow of Gaddafi could possibly be considered legitimate, the limits 
and ambiguities of this construct will be identified and a different reading will be proposed (4). 
Finally, based on the analysis of Resolution 1970, regime de-legitimation will be explored as a 
genuine application of RtoP (5). 
 
 
2. Resolutions 1970 and 1973 and NATO’s intervention in Libya: a fine line between major 
achievements and objectionable deviations 
 
Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1970 and 1973 represent one of the most relevant 
achievements in the growing acceptance of RtoP within the framework of the United Nations (UN).  
A number of factors make their approval ground-breaking.  
First of all, for the first time these two documents call the doctrine by name, explicitly evoking ‘the 
responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population’ in their preambles, rather 
than simply referring to paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, as earlier 
UNSC’s documents did1. The doctrine has indeed made its official entrance in the lexicon of the 
UN organ, overcoming, once and for all, some States’ hesitation in recognizing the Security 
Council as the correct venue to implement RtoP2.  
Secondly, using the means provided by the UN Charter, Resolutions 1970 and 1973 give a 
collective response to grave human rights violations. Although the reference to RtoP contained in 
the preambles is circumscribed to the less controversial dimension (ie the responsibility to protect 
bearing upon the State), these two documents - both based on Chapter VII - put into practice the 
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international dimension of the doctrine (ie the responsibility to protect bearing upon the 
international community). This is the first time that the third pillar has been implemented.  
Finally, although it is argued that NATO’s intervention in Libya may have impacted destructively 
on general approval of RtoP, its basic criteria3 are currently used to evaluate both the UNSC’s 
decision to authorize military action in Libya and the way NATO has conducted the operation. 
Therefore, RtoP is still to be considered a parameter of legitimacy for the international response to 
grave human rights violations: whether the concrete action is objectionable or not, this does not 
completely invalidate the process of the doctrine’s general acceptance. 
More precisely, scholars generally consider the ‘just cause threshold’ and the ‘last resort’ 
requirements met in the Security Council’s decision to authorize the use of force in the present case. 
Where the ‘just cause threshold’ is concerned, while some people consider that the gravity of the 
case was clear from the very beginning of the Libyan army’s brutal reaction to pacific 
demonstrations4, others recognize that the situation became intolerable when Gaddafi uttered 
serious threats against the insurgents, even calling them ‘cockroaches’ and thus terminologically 
evoking the spectre of Rwandan genocide5. Also, even those who regret that the Security Council 
did not carry out a serious and independent investigation into the crisis, but mainly relied on media 
reports6, could not deny that the situation was serious and alarming7. As for the ‘last resort’ 
requirement, although some claim the lack of concrete support from the Security Council to the 
African Union’s efforts for a peaceful settlement of the crisis8, the adoption of Resolution 1970 
undeniably illustrates that the Security Council concretely explored the possibility of settling the 
case with means that did not involve the use of force. 
RtoP requirements have also been used to evaluate the intervention of the Atlantic Alliance. 
In this regard, scholars have contested both the requirements of the ‘right intention’ and the 
proportionality of means used by NATO.  
With regard to the humanitarian purpose, while Resolution 1973 clearly states, fully in line with 
RtoP, that the aim of the operation was the protection of civilians, the very manner of the 
intervention patently revealed the intervening forces’ intention to pursue a different goal, namely 
regime change. As one author underlined, ‘the actions of the coalition forces appeared to take the 
intervention well beyond the resolution’s terms and, therefore, in all probability, beyond what the 
UN Charter could be interpreted to allow. Even the most ardent international advocates of R2P have 
acknowledged that the mandate was stretched to breaking point and maybe beyond it’9. The 
intervening countries made such a different purpose clear. In mid April 2011, ‘Cameron, Sarkozy 
and Obama jointly wrote in a newspaper article: “Our duty and our mandate under UN Security 
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Council Resolution 1973 is to protect civilians, and we are doing that. It is not to remove Gadhafi 
by force. But it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Gadhafi in power”’10. 
Not surprisingly, then, the most critical profile of the intervention concerns the proportionality of 
the means used by the NATO forces. This profile is connected to the instrumental use of the 
humanitarian purpose, since the regime change was certainly accelerated by “NATO’s choice of 
targets, whom it supplied and received intelligence to/from and the way it implemented the arms 
embargo”11. A number of authors, along with many States, have accused NATO of having 
interpreted its mandate too extensively. In particular, even if the first operations against the loyalist 
forces were considered fully in accordance with the mandate formulated in Resolution 1973, the 
decision to continue the bombing later, when Gaddafi’s supporters were in a minority, was strongly 
criticized and considered an unlawful intervention in favour of the rebels in a civil war12. 
Additionally, some people consider the supply of weapons to insurgents – by the Atlantic Alliance 
(and France in the first place) – as a blatant violation of the arms embargo, set out in Resolution 
1970 and reaffirmed in Resolution 197313. In fact, the embargo was not limited to the weapons 
destined to Gaddafi’s forces, but was formulated in very broad terms, pursuing the cessation of 
hostilities as the ultimate goal.  
 
Although the adoption of Resolutions 1970 and 1973 marks a major achievement in the growing 
acceptance of the doctrine, ‘the intervention in Libya, rather than extending the opportunities for 
RtoP to be applied, may have had the opposite effect. In this regard, various countries, including 
India, China, Brazil, Russia, and South Africa, have argued that the case of Libya has given RtoP a 
bad name’14. The most critical profile is regime change, which represents a clear departure from the 
original purpose of the operation as identified by the Security Council, and the main reason why 
NATO exceeded the mandate assigned, possibly violating Resolution 1973. 
This may pose a strong limit to the future implementation of RtoP, but also for others kind of 
operations, since ‘the perception of ulterior motives and agendas may make it more difficult in the 
future to forge a consensus on the use of force for protection purposes, within the context of either a 
peacekeeping operation or a potential humanitarian intervention’15. 
 
 
3. Regime change in Libya: foreign military intervention in an internal conflict authorized by 
the Security Council? 
 
Regime change is certainly not a new issue in international relations. In fact, it has been carried out 
many times by States – mainly outside the framework of the UN – with the main aim of enhancing 
strategic, economic or ideological plans16, and was often screened by the need to improve the 
humanitarian and/or social conditions of the local population.  
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The specious reference to a humanitarian aim to camouflage the removal of an undesirable regime 
had already emerged, for example, during the US intervention in Iraq in 2003. Although, at one 
point, the American administration affirmed (even evoking the vocabulary of RtoP17) that it was 
intervening in order to help the Iraqi people get rid of a bloody regime, it was clear that the 
intervention was actually aimed at eliminating Saddam Hussein.  
From a legal point of view, the issue is far more complex in the case of Libya, where the 
intervention, explicitly mandated by the UNSC to protect civilians, took place during a crisis that 
had already become a civil war. In fact, while international law certainly prohibits military 
intervention in a civil war in support of the insurgents and aimed at defeating the effective 
government, in some extreme cases the protection of civilians (as the mandate contained in 
Resolution 1973) can be achieved by just eliminating the oppression at its origin, ie a regime 
responsible for grave violations.  
Three different profiles must be analysed to assess the legitimacy of NATO’s intervention aimed at 
regime change in Libya: (a) whether foreign military intervention in an internal conflict is 
consistent with international law; (b) whether the UNSC can legitimately authorize intervention to 
lend support to insurgents against the government in power; and, (c) whether Resolution 1973 was 
intended to permit such an operation (even implicitly), at least as a means to achieve the protection 
of civilians.  
 
a) Regime change and international law: the legitimacy of foreign military intervention in 
internal conflicts 
 
While intervention in an internal conflict in support of rebels is certainly unlawful under 
international law, one could argue that – at some point – NATO’s military operation was based on 
the consent expressed by the new government of Libya, ie the insurgents organized in the Libyan 
National Transitional Council (NTC). In other words, the conflict in Libya, while originally a mixed 
one (an international armed conflict between Libya and NATO, and a non-international armed 
conflict between Gaddafi and the insurgents) underwent a process of internalization18.  
A major problem of this reconstruction is identifying exactly when the rebels became subjects who 
could legitimately call for external armed intervention.  
It is certainly not sufficient to maintain that ‘during later stages of the Libyan armed conflict there 
was a change in the international legal status of the Libyan rebel-insurgents to belligerents, and they 
consented to and welcomed U.S. and NATO uses of force’19. This position reflects the 
identification of three different stages in the evolution of an internal conflict. According to a similar 
reconstruction (commonly accepted before the adoption of the UN Charter), at the beginning of the 
conflict (a phase defined as ‘rebellion’, in which the government maintains control over most of the 
territory), third States could support the central government, but should refrain from providing help 
to different forces. When, however, these forces gain more control, the situation becomes 
‘insurgency’ and other parties should refrain from responding to any request for support, regardless 
of which side formulates it. Once the opponents have increased their control over the territory, 
leading to the emergence of a real state of ‘belligerency’, third States should recognize both sides as 
belligerents, and intervention would then be lawful if exercised at the request of one of them20. 
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As many scholars have clarified, this idea is now to be considered obsolete21: thus, while 
intervention at the government’s invitation is admissible, a request made by different parties could 
not justify foreign intervention. The International Court of Justice confirmed the point in the case of 
Nicaragua v. USA, stating: ‘it is difficult to say what would remain of the principle of non-
intervention in international law if intervention, which is already permitted at the request of the 
government of a State, were to be allowed also at the request of the opposition’22.  
It is true, however, that at a certain point the National Transitional Council was recognized by a 
number of States as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people23, or even as the legitimate 
government of the country24. The UNSC maintained a more cautious position, encouraging the 
NTC as ‘the Libyan authorities’ to implement its plans25, while the Libya Contact Group expressed 
a stronger opinion, declaring that ‘the Qaddafi regime no longer has any legitimate authority in 
Libya and that Qaddafi and certain members of his family must go. Henceforth and until an interim 
authority is in place, participants agreed to deal with the National Transitional Council as the 
legitimate governing authority in Libya’26.  
Nevertheless, recognition of the NTC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan population may 
confer a number of advantages27 on the insurgents, but ‘leaves intact the international legal status of 
the incumbent Qaddafi government as the government of Libya’28. Moreover, recognition of the 
National Transitional Council as the legitimate government of the State would not per se be 
sufficient to convert it into the effective government of Libya, with the authority to call for foreign 
military aid. As one author efficiently explained, together with ‘broad international recognition’, 
two more requirements should be met: on one hand, the old regime [must have] lost control over 
most of the country, and the likelihood of it regaining such control in the short to medium term 
[must be] small or none (negative element)’ and, on the other, ‘the new regime [must have] 
established control over a significant part of the country, and [must be] legitimized in an inclusive 
process that makes it broadly representative of the people (positive element)’29. If it is not 
accompanied by these elements, the recognition of a group of opponents as a new government of a 
State, would be ‘premature and would arguably constitute an illegal interference in the internal 
affairs’ of such a State30.  
In conclusion, even if it cannot be excluded that, at a certain point, the conflict did become a purely 
internal one, with NATO forces fighting in support of the new legitimate government of Libya, this 
was not so at the beginning, unless one considers the call for UN intervention, made by the Libyan 
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representative at the UN, Ambassador Shalgam31, as an invitation from an accredited government 
representative. Whereas, according to one author, such consent ‘partially vitiated concerns about 
violating state sovereignty’32 it should be recognized that Ambassador Shalgam was clearly 
speaking in a personal capacity, and not expressing the position of the central government he was 
called to represent. Hence, at least at the beginning, the NATO operation - aimed at overthrowing 
Gaddafi from power - should be considered not consistent with international law, which prohibits 
armed intervention in internal conflicts, against the will of the government.  
Since the intervention was, nevertheless, based on a Security Council mandate, it has to be 
established whether (and to what extent) regime change could have been authorized by Resolution 
1973. 
 
b) Regime change and the Security Council’s discretionary power  
 
Although regime change has sometimes been the main result of military intervention authorized by 
the Security Council, it was never defined as the main objective by the UN organ. In particular, ‘the 
Security Council has never authorized an intervention solely on the grounds that a government was 
illegitimate and did not meet democratic standards’33. In Haiti, for example, ‘it was (…) not the 
violation of democratic standards as such that constituted a threat to the peace, but rather the 
destabilizing and deteriorating conditions that went with the undemocratic change’34. The 
intervention in that case, was ‘not a precedent for collective intervention aimed at regime change, 
but rather a precedent for collective intervention aimed at reinstating the internationally recognized 
government’35. Furthermore, in spite of the broad discretion it enjoys, the Security Council is not 
completely legibus solutus, as the provisions of the Charter ‘constitute legal boundaries for [its] 
action, and resolutions that transcend these boundaries are ultra vires and illegal’36.  
However, while the Charter confirms principles such as equality among sovereign states and the 
prohibition of interference in domestic affairs, it also provides for a major exception as far as ‘the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII’ is concerned (art. 2.7).  
Moreover, the Security Council has complete discretion in deciding whether to take measures under 
Chapter VII, and, in particular, it is completely free when determining the existence of a threat to 
peace ex article 39. Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has gradually come to 
appreciate how economic, social, humanitarian and environmental instability can undermine peace 
efforts no less than conflict between states. The case of Somalia, in particular, established once and 
for all that serious violations of human rights are a threat to international peace and security, which 
can lead to a reaction from the Security Council.  
As a result of this evolution, it cannot be excluded that the Security Council may authorize an 
intervention to lend support to insurgents against the government in power, whenever the latter, 
because of its behaviour, represents a threat to international peace and security. This option would 
not ‘shake the foundations of international community and (...) de-stabilize international law, posing 
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great risks’37, any more than the international community’s apathy in the face of a grave 
humanitarian tragedy would undermine the credibility of the UN system.  
 
c) Regime change under Resolution 1973: do the ends justify the means? 
 
Since regime change is not explicitly considered under Resolution 1973, the question is whether the 
purpose of protecting civilians was broad enough to cover this option.  
According to one author, although it did not explicitly provide for it, the mandate ‘did not 
categorically rule out the possibility of regime change in Libya on the basis of Resolution 1973’. In 
particular, the Security Council ‘did not ignore the democratic dimension of the conflict’38: neither 
in Resolution 1970 (calling for steps to fulfil the legitimate demands of the population), nor in 
Resolution 1973 (emphasizing that a solution to the crisis must respond to the legitimate demands 
of the Libyan people). 
However, given the vague formulation of the Resolution, which authorized Member States ‘to take 
all necessary measures (…) to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of 
attack’39, it is no surprise that differences emerged on its interpretation soon after its adoption.  
While NATO (and some of its allies, like Qatar and Jordan) interpreted the mandate as ‘providing 
the basis for a wide range of military activities including the suppression of Libya’s air defences, air 
force and other aviation capacities, as well as the use of force against Libya’s fielded forces, its 
capacity to sustain fielded forces, and its command and control capacities, on the basis that Libya’s 
armed forces constituted a threat to civilians’40, a number of UN member States disagreed. Among 
others41, Nicaragua and Venezuela expressed strong disapproval. The Nicaraguan government 
lamented ‘the shameful manipulation of the slogan “protection of civilians” for dishonourable 
political purposes’ and accused: ‘once again, the logic of interventionism and hegemony has 
prevailed through a disastrous decision with incalculable potential consequences for tens of millions 
of individuals worldwide’42. Venezuela complained of a violation of the UN Charter and of 
Resolution 1973, ‘which calls for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya’43.  
On the other side, a number of scholars consider that ‘the line between the protection of civilians 
and regime change [can] not always be easily drawn. Occasionally, but hopefully not too 
frequently, regime change may be determined to be the only viable strategy to prevent the 
commission of governmental atrocities’44. As a consequence, even acknowledging that regime 
change and protection of civilians are two completely separate goals45, one must admit that, ‘while 
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4. Limits and ambiguities of regime change in Libya as an application of RtoP; another 
possible interpretation: regime de-legitimation  
 
The previous analysis demonstrates that military intervention in favour of insurgents is not 
compatible with international law and that, in the case of Libya, an invitation by a new legitimate 
government cannot be recognized at the beginning of NATO’s bombing campaign. Although the 
Security Council may legitimately authorize an intervention against a government in power (in 
particular, when it represents a threat to international peace and security), in the present case the 
authorization was formulated with a different explicit purpose, ie the protection of civilians and 
civilian populated areas under threat of attack. Thus, to consider regime change as admitted by 
Resolution 1973, a similar option should be deemed necessary to protect civilians, as the unique 
legitimate goal identified by the Security Council for the operation.  
This is complicated for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, from an international lawyer’s perspective, in the absence of precise knowledge of military 
data and factual assessment, the answer can only be approximate and, most probably, highly 
conditioned by personal views on the need to give prominence to the respect of sovereignty (as a 
guarantee of the international order), or to immediate and efficient protection of human rights, at 
any cost. 
Secondly, and from a more concrete perspective, even admitting that the overthrow of Gaddafi was 
crucial to save a high number of lives, this only became evident after a while, and not from the very 
beginning of the intervention. In fact, at least potentially, the military intervention could have been 
a deterrent to Gaddafi’s proposition to destroy his enemies. Accordingly, when NATO began the 
operation, the intervention was unlawfully directed against a government in power, and it only 
became legitimate at a certain point, when the removal of Gaddafi proved necessary to fulfil the 
mandate. 
Last, but not least, although realpolitik suggests that regime change should not be excluded from 
the range of potential means adopted to implement the responsibility to protect47, it is certainly not a 
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necessary to achieve that disabling will vary from case to case’, ICISS (3) 35. 
More recently, Edward Luck has confirmed the point in an interview: ‘it isn’t the goal of the responsibility to protect to 
change regimes. The goal is to protect populations. It may be in some cases that the only way to protect populations is 
to change the regime, but that certainly is not the goal of the R2P per se’, Bernard Gwertzman, ‘Will Syria Follow 
Libya? Interview with Edward Luck (Council on Foreign Relations, 1 September 2011) 
<http://www.cfr.org/syria/syria-follow-libya/p25745> accessed 2 February 2013. 
The international community should be involved in protection only when the State (which has the primary 
responsibility) is unwilling or unable to accomplish to its own task but, as the author states, the ‘language of inability or 
unwillingness is overly diplomatic. It obscures the reality that in many modern conflicts, (…) the state itself, or at least 
desirable application of RtoP. First of all, possible abuses connected to a misleading use of the 
humanitarian purpose, represent the major obstacle to a broad acceptance of the doctrine, which is 
essential for its complete and suitable implementation. Moreover, even admitting that, in some 
exceptional cases, regime change can be genuinely pursued because it is strictly necessary to protect 
people, militarily imposed regime change does not offer any guarantee of sustainability, unlike a 
democratic transition based on political negotiations.  
For all these reasons, rather than the tolerability of regime change as an exceptional measure to 
implement the international community’s responsibility to protect, a different reading, based more 
strictly on the main concepts of RtoP, is preferable in Libya’s case.  
In fact, the general endorsement of RtoP through the adoption of the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
(when States solemnly proclaimed that they had ‘responsibility to protect [their] populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’ and formally accepted that 
responsibility, undertaking ‘to act in accordance with it’48) validated, once and for all, the 
transformation of sovereignty from a simple container of privileges to a more complex mix of 
prerogatives and duties.  
Some authors, according to whom ‘the sovereign state’s responsibility and accountability to both 
domestic and external constituencies must be affirmed as interconnected principles of the national 
and international order’, have supported the idea since 199649. More precisely, ‘sovereignty is not 
merely the right to be undisturbed from without, but the responsibility to perform the tasks expected 
of an effective government’50. The point was later developed by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001, and clearly confirmed in 2004 by the High Level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges and Change, which pointed out that ‘in signing the Charter of the UN, States 
not only benefit from the privileges of sovereignty but also accept its responsibilities. Whatever 
perceptions may have prevailed when the Westphalian system first gave rise to the notion of State 
sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a State to protect the welfare of its own 
peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international community’51.  
Such changes in the perception of the most fundamental element of the international legal order, 
have certainly established a two-way tie between the rights and responsibilities of States, confirmed 
by the idea that the international community plays a complementary role in providing protection. 
Sovereignty directly implies the duty to protect people from atrocities, to the extent that, when a 
State is unable or unwilling to fulfil such an obligation, the international community has the 
complementary duty to step in its place and protect its citizens. The unconditional non-intervention 
principle conclusively gives way, in the case of a State’s failure to safeguard its people, to the 
international community’s complementary onus to protect, which can indeed override the strict 
fences of (formerly unchallenged) sovereignty. 
Although this theory cannot sic et simpliciter negate the sovereign status of a government that 
seriously violates human rights, it is possible to affirm that whenever a State fails to protect its own 
citizens (or, even worse, plays a primary role in their repression), it loses an essential part of its 
sovereignty, and is progressively de-legitimated.  
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2012) <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/for-justice-and-civilians-dont-rule-out-regime-
change/article4372211/> accessed 2 February 2013. Rejecting regime change from the measures applicable to 
implement the international responsibility to protect would be tantamount to excluding the application of the doctrine 
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This is easily ascertained in the case of Libya, where the sovereign prerogatives of Gaddafi’s 
government were weakened at the hands of the Security Council, even before the military 
intervention by NATO, and as a direct consequence of the grave violations of the fundamental 
rights of its own population. This process, implemented mainly through Resolution 1970, is 
founded on a renewed definition of sovereignty inspired by RtoP. 
 
 
5. UNSC Res. 1970 and the de-legitimation of Gaddafi’s government as an application of RtoP 
 
Although the adoption of Resolution 1973 (passed with the abstention of five States52, including 
two permanent members) was much more controversial than the adoption of Resolution 1970, 
which was passed unanimously, the latter had a by no means minor impact on the regime. In fact, 
Resolution 1970 certified the occurring de-legitimation of Gaddafi’s government. 
One author has expressed serious concerns about the possibility of recognizing that the Security 
Council has the power of de-legitimation, as it would imply recognition of the UN organ as a 
governmental authority, ‘totally chang[ing] the way we comprehend international law and 
international community shifting it from a mainly state-centered, to a SC-centered [approach]’ . 
Also considering that the Security Council ‘is not a democratically elected, ‘government-type’ 
organ, nor it was intended to be’, the attribution of this type of authority ‘would contradict the very 
foundations of the UN Charter, which establish the equality of all states but also the formation of 
international community as a community of equal states’53. 
However, if one correctly applies the RtoP theories, it becomes clear that regimes lose legitimacy 
not because of an international reaction, but as a direct consequence of their own behaviour, and as 
the result of the current idea of sovereignty as the responsibility to protect. While regime de-
legitimation is not determined by the reaction of the international community (and the UNSC in 
first place) to a criminal government, this reaction is what concretely detects de-legitimation.  
In the present case, Resolution 1970 triggered the process of de-legitimation of the Libyan 
government by (a) imposing a travel ban and asset freeze on Gaddafi, his family, and other high-
ranking officials, and (b) referring the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Resolution 1973 has then completed the process (c). 
 
a) Targeted sanctions against a sitting Head of State as a means of regime de-
legitimation 
 
Although Gaddafi’s government was not a complete stranger to sanctions, they had previously been 
adopted as comprehensive measures (i.e. against the State) and mainly in order to inhibit the 
regime’s support to international terrorism54. On the contrary, in Libya, Resolution 1970 applied 
sanctions against individuals for the first time, strictly motivated by the regime’s behaviour which 
was detrimental to the civilian population. 
As we all know, since the end of the cold war, a renewed willingness on the part of the permanent 
members of the Security Council to use the instruments of Chapter VII, has produced an increase in 
the number of sanctions imposed on States by the UN organ. The range of the measures adopted 
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was varied and covered economic and trade sanctions, arms embargoes, and diplomatic 
restrictions55. However, after the experience matured in Iraq in the 1990’s, a number of States and 
many humanitarian organizations expressed serious concern about the negative humanitarian impact 
of comprehensive sanctions, which mainly affect the most vulnerable members of the population. 
To reduce such adverse effects and to increase the effectiveness of sanctions, the United Nations 
developed and stepped up the use of targeted sanctions, ie measures imposed against individuals 
and entities, rather than against the State as a whole.  
These measures are employed consistently to fight international terrorism, being ‘typically applied 
either as incentives to change behaviour or as preventive measures’56. Understandably, indeed, 
‘sanctions to stem the financing of terrorism or to deny safe haven or travel by terrorists have 
become valuable tools in the global effort to counter terrorism’57. Nevertheless, ‘smart’ sanctions 
have been and are also imposed on rebel leaders and/or groups, warlords, and even businessmen in 
league with culpable political elites or involved in arm trafficking. In a few cases they have been 
used against former Heads of State: the sanctions adopted against Saddam Hussein58, Charles 
Taylor59 and Laurent Gbagbo60 are worthy of mention.  
Unlike the precedents mentioned above, Resolution 1970 imposed an asset freeze and a travel ban 
on a sitting Head of State for the first time in the history of the UN. Moreover, while the hostile 
activities of Saddam Hussein, Charles Taylor and Laurent Gbagbo were undermining UN efforts to 
re-establish peace and security, in Iraq, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire respectively, in Libya’s case, 
Gaddafi’s conduct was at the very origin of the Security Council’s concerns for the country. 
Although Resolution 1970 does not clearly identify the threat to international peace and security, it 
de facto characterises the Libyan government’s behaviour in these terms.  
 
b) The referral to the ICC and the arrest warrant against Gaddafi: a coup de grace for 
the regime  
 
Resolution 1970 refers a situation in a non-member State to the ICC. As set out in art. 13 (b) of the 
Rome Statute, the referral pertains, in general terms, to the overall situation existing in Libya since 
15 February 201161. Nonetheless, the Security Council, ‘considering that the widespread and 
systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian 
population may amount to crimes against humanity’, undoubtedly intended to bring to the 
Prosecutor’s attention the conduct of the ‘highest level of the Libyan government’, which was 
explicitly blamed for ‘incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian population’62.  
One author affirmed that ‘a major purpose of the International Criminal Court is to indict culpable 
sitting heads of state, and that purpose necessarily (and not coincidentally) imports regime 
change’63. In fact, the experiences in Sudan and Libya tell us a different story, respectively 
demonstrating that the ICC cannot even work as a deterrent, if it encounters resistance from the 
States called to cooperate with it, and that (not surprisingly at all) military intervention has far 
greater chances of (rapid) success in forcing a change of regime.  
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However, regardless of its success or failure in each individual case, the main consequence of the 
ICC’s involvement, especially if based on a Security Council referral, is the decreased legitimacy of 
the government, whenever its members are accused. In fact, what can be more destructive for a 
government’s legitimacy than a well-grounded accusation against the Head of State of having 
committed international crimes against his own population?  
While the referral was per se a strong indication of the government’s diminished legitimacy, the 
issue of an arrest warrant against Gaddafi was certainly the ‘last nail in its coffin’ for his regime.  
 
c) The significance of Resolution 1973 in the de-legitimation process, and regime 
change as a possible final outcome 
 
In this construction, the authorization to use ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians at risk 
crowned the process of de-legitimation of the Gaddafi regime, implementing the international 
community’s complementary duty to protect. In fact, ‘Resolution 1973 (…) marked the first time 
the Council had authorized the use of force for human protection purposes against the wishes of a 
functioning state. (…) In passing Resolution 1973, the Council showed that it will not be inhibited 
as a matter of principle from authorizing enforcement for protection purposes by the absence of host 
state consent’64.  
Certainly, brought to the extreme consequences, this de-legitimation could make a regime change 
more feasible. As a matter of fact, as correctly noted by another author, the sanctions contained in 
Resolution 1970, while they aimed to induce Gaddafi’s government to stop attacking civilians, ‘also 
supported the struggle of the Libyan opposition against the regime’65. Moreover, regime change 
could probably be more easily considered as legitimate (although still not entirely lawful) if it is 
seen the peak of a gradual process. But, nonetheless and most importantly, from this perspective 
regime change would not be too strictly related to RtoP, threatening a widespread and correct 
application of the doctrine. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973 are some of the most relevant achievements in the acceptance of 
RtoP within the United Nations framework. On the other hand, NATO’s intervention in Libya 
represents one of the most controversial applications of RtoP in practice.  
One major critical issue is the instrumental use of the humanitarian purpose to justify an operation 
aimed at effecting (or supporting) regime change. Admitting regime change in Libya as included 
within the mandate provided by the UNSC in Resolution 1973 is neither linear nor immediate. Most 
importantly, this recognition (though not completely unrelated to the RtoP logic) could have a 
potential negative impact on the doctrine’s future development.  
If an application of the RtoP doctrine has to be detected in the Libya case, it would be more 
correctly identified in the de-legitimation of Gaddafi’s regime rather than in its overthrow. Rather 
than being a simple paradigm to verify the lawfulness of militarily imposed regime change, RtoP is 
the material basis for a different reading (regime de-legitimation), as a major application of the 
current idea of sovereignty as responsibility 
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